



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

ON THE ORIGIN OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF οὐ μὴ WITH THE SUBJUNCTIVE AND THE FUTURE INDICATIVE.

BY W. W. GOODWIN.

THE origin of the construction of οὐ μὴ has never been satisfactorily explained. While there is a general agreement as to the meaning of the two forms of expression in which this double negative occurs, that (1) οὐ μὴ γένηται or οὐ μὴ γενήσεται is *it will not happen*, and (2) οὐ μὴ καταβήσκει is *do not come down*, there is great diversity of opinion as to the manner in which these meanings are obtained from the Greek expressions, and still greater as to the origin of the constructions themselves. Most scholars have explained expressions of *denial* with οὐ μὴ and those of *prohibition* on entirely different theories, which involve different views of the functions of the negatives in the two forms. The explanation of the expressions of denial (like οὐ μὴ γένηται) which has gained most favor is that of an ellipsis after οὐ of a verb or other form denoting fear on which μὴ γένηται depends; so that the full form would be οὐ δέος ἐστὶ μὴ γένηται, *there is no fear that it will happen*. Since a strong argument for this ellipsis is the existence of such examples as οὐ φόβος μὴ σε ἀγάγω, XEN. *Mem.* ii. 1, 25, and οὐχὶ δέος μὴ σε φιλήσῃ, AR. *Ecccl.* 650, which, by omitting φόβος and δέος, would become οὐ μὴ σε ἀγάγω and οὐχὶ μὴ σε φιλήσῃ, it can hardly be said that this is supposed to be one of the unconscious ellipses which are no longer felt in actual use. This explanation, however, does not help to account for the prohibitions in the second person, like οὐ μὴ καταβήσκει, for there is no freak of language by which οὐ δέος ἐστὶ μὴ καταβήσκει or even οὐ δέος ἐστὶ μὴ καταβήσκει (if we can suppose such an expression) could be transformed into οὐ μὴ καταβήσκει, in the sense *do not come down*. The prohibitions have, therefore, generally been explained, on Elmsley's theory, as interrogative; and οὐ μὴ καταβήσκει is supposed to mean *will you not not come down?* i.e. *do not come down*. All subjunctives that are found in these prohibitions, as

in οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς μηδὲ ποιήσῃς, ARIST. *Nub.* 296, have generally been condemned since Brunck and Elmsley, and such subjunctives are seldom seen in recent editions of the dramatists.

But all attempts to explain these constructions of οὐ μὴ on different theories lead to fatal difficulties. We cannot make all the prohibitions interrogative, nor can we change all the prohibitory subjunctives to futures without violence to the text; nor are all cases of the second person of the subjunctive or of the future with οὐ μὴ prohibitory. The following examples show a complete transition from one of the uses of οὐ μὴ to the other, and yet no line of distinction, on which different theories of construction can reasonably be based, can be drawn between any two of them:—

Οὔτοι σ' Ἀχαιῶν, οἶδα, μὴ τις ὑβρίσῃ, *no one of the Achaeans, I am sure, will insult you.* SOPH. *Aj.* 560. οὐ σοι μὴ μεθέψομαί ποτε, *I never will follow you.* ID. *El.* 1052. κοῦχί μὴ παύσῃσθε, *and you will not cease.* ARIST. *Lys.* 704. ἀλλ' οὐ ποτ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ γε μὴ πάθῃς τόδε, *but you shall never suffer this from me.* SOPH. *El.* 1029. οὐ μὴ ποτ' ἐς τὴν Σκῦρον ἐκπλεύσῃς, *you shall never sail off to Scyros.* ID. *Phil.* 381. οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς . . . ἀλλ' εὐφήμει, *do not jeer (i.e. you shall not jeer), but hold your tongue.* ARIST. *Nub.* 296 (this cannot be interrogative). οὐ μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα μηδ' ἄψει πέπλων, *do not bring your hand near me, nor touch my garments.* EUR. *Hippol.* 606 (generally made interrogative).

It should be made a first requisite of any theory that it shall explain all these cases on the same general principle.

A preliminary question to be settled, if possible, is whether οὐ and μὴ merely combine to make a single strong negative, or whether οὐ as an independent adverb negatives μὴ and the verb taken together. The difficulty either of conceiving οὐ and μὴ as forming a single strong negative, as οὐ and οὐδέν or μὴ and μηδέν often do, or of understanding how μὴ γένηται, which by itself cannot mean *it will not happen*, can be strengthened by οὐ into an expression *with* this very meaning, has made it impossible to defend the former view on any recognized principle, even when it has been adopted for want of something better. I formerly held this opinion, but I have never attempted to defend it by any analogy of the language. The supposed analogy of μὴ οὐ forming a single negative with the infinitive will hardly hold as a support of this; for, while we cannot have a

sentence like οὐχ ὅσιν ἐστι μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν continued by an infinitive with οὐδέ (e.g. by οὐδὲ ἀμύνεσθαι), we frequently have sentences like οὐ μὴ καλεῖς με μηδὲ κατερεῖς τοῦνομα, where μηδέ continues the prohibition without repeating οὐ, showing the distinct force of each part of this double negative. But this only brings out more emphatically the perplexing question that lies at the basis of the whole discussion. If οὐ is an independent negative, as by every principle of Greek negatives it should be, what does it negative? It is clear that there is only one *active* negative in οὐ μὴ γένηται, *it will not happen*; and οὐ μὴ σκώψης, *do not jeer*, surely does not have one *more* active negative than μὴ σκώψης.¹

It seems obvious, therefore, that if οὐ is an independent negative in οὐ μὴ γένηται, the negative force of the μὴ must in some way be in abeyance, as otherwise the two simple negatives would make the sentence as a whole positive. We may naturally turn for a suggestion here to the principal form of expression in which the negative force of μὴ seems to be in abeyance, — to Plato's favorite subjunctive with μὴ as a form of cautious assertion, as μὴ φαῦλον ἦ, *I think it will prove to be bad*, *Crat.* 425 B. Such expressions are, practically, cautious affirmative statements, the fear that something may prove true having by usage softened into a suspicion, and this again into an idea of probability or possibility, so that μὴ φαῦλον ἦ, which originally meant *may it not prove bad* (as *I fear it may*), has come to mean *I suspect it may prove bad*, and finally, *I think it will prove bad* or *it will probably prove bad*. The expression, however, always retains at least the implication that the fact thus stated is an object of apprehension to *some one*, though it has lost all of its original reference to such apprehension on the part of the speaker.² If now a

¹ The idea suggested rather than advocated by Gildersleeve (*Am. Jour. Philol.* III. pp. 203, 205), that οὐ is an independent negative, *nay*, while μὴ introduces a question which expects a negative answer, was evidently held by the copyists of some of the best Mss. of Aristophanes or by their predecessors: thus, *Rav.* and several *Paris* Mss. have οὐ· μὴ σκώψης (or σκώψης), in *Nub.* 296; *Ven.* 474 has οὐ· μὴ ληρήσῃς in *Nub.* 367, and οὐ· μὴ λαλήσεις in 505. See the *Ms. readings* given in *Trans. of Amer. Philol. Assoc.* for 1869–70, p. 52.

² I give the following passages of Plato, with Jowett's translation, to illustrate this idiom: —

Ἄλλως δὲ συνείρειν μὴ φαῦλον ἦ καὶ οὐ καθ' ὅδον, ᾧ φίλε Ἑρμόγενης, *if they are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work,*

writer wished to express the negative of one of these cautious assertions, in which the original force of *μή* has practically disappeared, he would say, for example, οὐ *μή* φαῦλον ἦ, *it will not prove to be bad*. We thus have a simple explanation of such sentences as οὐ *μή* οἶός τ' ἦς, *you will not be able*, PLAT. *Rep.* 341 B, and οὐ *μή* δυνατός ὦ, *I shall not be able*, Id. *Phileb.* 48 D, the former being the negative of *μή* οἶός τ' ἦς, *I suspect you will be able*, the latter of *μή* δυνατός ὦ, *I suspect that I shall be able*. So, by prefixing οὐ to *μή* ἀναγκαῖον ἦ, we have οὐ *μή* ἀναγκαῖον ἦ, *it will not be necessary*. (See foot-note, page 70.)

This use of *μή* with the independent subjunctive in Plato is, however, confined to the present subjunctive, and generally to ἦ or ἔχῃ (with an adverb), while οὐ *μή* generally has the aorist subjunctive or the future indicative, and only rarely the present subjunctive, even in Plato. Still, the successful application of the principle to the few present subjunctives which are like those above quoted indicates that we are on the right track.

The independent subjunctive with *μή* is by no means confined to the Platonic construction above mentioned, although this is its chief representative in Attic Greek. It is familiar in Homer in expressions of apprehension combined with a desire to avert the object of fear; as *μή* δὲ νῆας ἔλωσι, *may they not seize the ships (as I fear they may)*, *Il.* xvi. 128. In such expressions sometimes the fear itself and sometimes the desire to avert the danger is more prominent; see *Od.* v. 415: *μή* πῶς μ' ἐκβαίνοντα βάλῃ λίθακι προτὶ πέτρῃ κύμα μέγ' ἄρπάξαν, μελέῃ δέ μοι ἔσσεται ὁρμή, i.e. *I fear that some wave may dash me upon a rock as I am emerging from the sea, and my effort will (then) be in vain* (the clause of fear being merged in a direct statement). See also *Il.* ii. 195, xviii. 8; *Od.* v. 356, xvi. 255. Between Homer and Plato we find only eight cases of independent *μή* (or *μή* οὐ) with the subjunctive;¹ but in these we can see the transition from Homer's

and in the wrong direction. *Crat.* 425 B. ἀλλὰ *μή* ὡς ἀληθῶς, τὸ τοῦ Ἑρμογένους, γλίσχρα ἦ ἡ ὁλκὴ αὐτῇ τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἦ καὶ τῷ φορτικῷ τοῦτοφ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ ξυνθήκῃ, *but the force of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a mean thing; and the mechanical aid of convention must be further employed.* *Ib.* 435 C. *μή* οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἦ, *the only question which remains to be considered is, etc.* *Crit.* 48 C.

¹ I depend here on Weber's statistics, given in his *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Absichtssätze*, in Schanz's *Beiträge*, Vol. II.

clause of apprehension to Plato's cautious assertion. In four of these cases the speaker expresses fear and a desire to avert its object. These are EUR. *Alc.* 315, μὴ σοὺς διαφθείρῃ γάμους, — *Orest.* 776, μὴ λάβωσί σ' ἄσμενοι, — *Herc. Fur.* 1399, ἀλλ' αἶμα μὴ σοῖς ἐξομόρξωμαι πέπλοις, — *Rhes.* 115, μὴ οὐ μόλῃς πόλιν. In the other four cases we see either the cautious assertion found in Plato or a near approach to it. In HDT. v. 79, we have ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ μαντήιον, *but I suspect rather that this will prove not to be the meaning of the oracle* (precisely Plato's usage). Cases of μὴ οὐ of course illustrate this use of μὴ with the subjunctive equally with those of the simple μὴ. In EUR. *Troad.* 982, Hecuba says to Helen, μὴ οὐ πείσῃς σοφούς, *I suspect you will not convince wise people*, with the same sarcastic tone which is in Plato's μὴ οὐκ ἢ διδακτὸν ἀρετῇ, *I suspect it will prove that virtue is not a thing to be taught*, *Men.* 94 E (said by Socrates, who is arguing that virtue is οὐ διδακτόν). In ARIST. *Eccl.* 795, most editions have μὴ γὰρ οὐ λάβῃς ὅποι (sc. ταῦτα καταθῇς, where the Mss. give an impossible λάβοις), *I suspect you will not find a place to put them down*, with the same affectation of anxiety as in the two preceding examples. In XEN. *Mem.* iv. 2, 12, we have one of the rare interrogative forms of the subjunctive with μὴ, in which Euthydemus says to Socrates, μὴ οὖν οὐ δύνωμαι (v. l. δύναμαι) ἐγὼ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα διηγῆσασθαι; *do you suspect that I shall be (or am) unable to explain the works of Justice?* He adds, καὶ νῆ Δί' ἐγωγε τὰ τῆς ἀδικίας, *I assure you, I can explain those of Injustice*. Here the spirit of the expression is the same as in the other cases. Compare the similar interrogatives in Plato: *Phaed.* 64 C, *Rep.* 603 C, *Parmen.* 163 D, *Sisyph.* 387 C. But for the eight cases of independent μὴ that have been quoted, we should never know that the construction existed between Homer and Plato. We have good ground for believing that it remained as a colloquial idiom in the language, though it seldom appeared in literature until Plato revived it and restored it to common use as a half-sarcastic form of expressing mildly a disagreeable truth. In Plato the construction is not confined to this peculiar sense, for we find cases in which honest apprehension is expressed as in the older use. Weber quotes *Euthyd.* 272 C, μὴ τοῖν ξένων τις ταῦτὸ τοῦτο ὀνειδίσῃ, *I am afraid some one may insult the two strangers in this same way* (or *let no one insult them, as I fear some one may*); also *Symp.* 193 B,

καὶ μή μοι ὑπολάβῃ, *I hope he will not answer me*; and *Leg.* 861 E, μή τοῖνυν τις οἴηται.

It appears, therefore, that the independent subjunctive with μή was in good use in the fifth century B.C. in the two senses illustrated by *EUR. Orest.* 776, μή λάβωσί σε, *I fear they may seize you*, and by *EUR. Troad.* 982, μή οὐ πείσῃς σοφούς, *I suspect you will fail to convince wise people*. From the persistence of the original meaning, even in Plato, we may probably assume that the expression more frequently included the idea of apprehension which is essential to it in Homer. But the other examples show that μή λάβωσί σε must have been in equally good use in the sense *I suspect they will seize you* (implying no apprehension). If, now, we suppose οὐ to be prefixed to μή λάβωσί σε, we shall have οὐ μή λάβωσί σε, which could be said with the meaning *I am not afraid that they will seize you*, and equally well with the meaning *they shall not seize you*. The former sense agrees precisely with that of some of the older uses of οὐ μή with the subjunctive. If the strange example from *Parmenides* (vs. 121) is genuine, we have οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσει, *there is no danger that any mortal will surpass you in wisdom*. In *AESCH. Sept.* 38 (one of the oldest cases, 467 B.C.), οὐ τι μή ληφθῶ δόλῳ, *I have no fear of being caught by any trick*, we can easily understand οὐ μή ληφθῶ as the negative of μή ληφθῶ, *I fear I may be caught*. So in *Parmenides* we have the negative of μή τίς σε παρελάσσει, *I fear some one may surpass you*. Οὐ μή τις ὀνειδίσῃ would be a natural negative of μή τις ὀνειδίσῃ, *I fear some one may insult*, in *PLAT. Euthyd.* 272 C. So, where there is no denial of apprehension, οὐ μή πάθῃς τόδε, *you shall not suffer this*, *SOPH. El.* 1029, may be the negative of μή πάθῃς τόδε, *I suspect you will suffer this*; and οὐ μή ἐκπλεύσῃς, *Id. Phil.* 381, may be the negative of μή ἐκπλεύσῃς, *I suspect you will sail away*. So οὐ μή ναῦς ἀφορμίσει (Kirchoff, -σῃς) χθονός, πρὶν ἄν, etc., *you shall not move your ships from the shore, until, etc.*, *EUR. Iph. Taur.* 18, will be the negative of μή ναῦς ἀφορμίσει, *I suspect you will move your ships*. These expressions with οὐ μή were always colloquial, as were also (at least in Attic Greek) the expressions, with μή and the subjunctive from which they are here supposed to have sprung.¹

¹ It may perhaps be urged, in opposition to the view here presented, that οὐ μή λάβωσί σε, *they will not seize you*, cannot be the negative of μή λάβωσί σε in its

If it is thought that the limited number of cases of independent μή with the subjunctive not implying apprehension do not justify the assumptions which have been based on them, it is easy to see how the change from the denial of an apprehension to the denial of a suspicion might have taken place within the οὐ μή construction itself. If we suppose such expressions as οὐ μή ληφθῶ and οὐ μή τίς σε ὑβρίσῃ to have been established as the negatives of μή ληφθῶ, *I fear I may be caught*, and μή τίς σε ὑβρίσῃ, *I fear some one may insult you*, they must soon have fallen out of this relation to the parent forms, and have been felt in use to be mere future negative assertions, so that they could not long be restricted to sentences in which apprehension was implied. Thus, οὐ μή ναῦς ἀφορμίσῃ χθονός would soon become as natural to those who used these forms as the older οὐ μή τίς σε ὑβρίσῃ. According to this view, οὐ μή with the subjunctive would come into the language in the sense of a denial of an apprehension, which is essentially the same general sense as that supposed by the theory of an ellipsis of δέος ἐστίν. But there is a great advantage in dispensing with this troublesome and improbable ellipsis, and deriving the meaning from the sentence as it stands. There is surely no more ground for assuming this ellipsis here than in the

sense of *I suspect they will seize you*, or even in that of *I fear they may seize you*, because the regular negative of this is μή οὐ λάβωσί σε, as we may call μή οὐ πέισῃ σοφούς, EUR. *Troad.* 982, the negative of μή πέισῃ σοφούς. But οὐ in μή οὐ πέισῃ negatives only the verb, whereas οὐ in οὐ μή πέισῃ would negative the whole expression μή πέισῃ. Μὴ οὐ πέισῃ is a cautious negative, meaning *I suspect you will not convince them*, corresponding in a certain way to μή πέισῃ, *I suspect you will convince them*. But οὐ μή πέισῃ would be the true negative of μή πέισῃ, denying it absolutely, in the sense *there is no ground for suspicion that you will convince them*, or (sometimes) *there is no fear that you will convince them*. There is all the difference in the world between suspecting a negation (e.g. suspecting that something will not happen) and negating a suspicion (e.g. denying that there is any suspicion that something will happen). Surely no one could understand μή οὐ δυνατός ᾧ, *I suspect I shall not be able*, as the negative of μή δυνατός ᾧ, *I suspect I shall be able*. The real negative is much rather οὐ μή δυνατός ᾧ, *there is no chance that I shall be able*, in PLAT. *Phileb.* 48 D. The negative power of οὐ in negating μή λάβωσί σε in its sense of *I fear they may seize you* is perhaps still more apparent. Whereas μή οὐ λάβωσί σε in this sense would mean *I am afraid they may not seize you*, οὐ μή λάβωσί σε would mean *I do not fear* (or *there is no danger*) *that they will seize you*, which is felt as a strong negative, *they will not seize you*.

independent subjunctive with *μή*, which is an older construction than the dependent subjunctive with *μή*. And if we accept *μή τίς σε ὑβρίσῃ* as a complete construction, without the help of *δέος ἐστίν*, it is absurd to invent an ellipsis to explain *οὐ μή τίς σε ὑβρίσῃ* as a shorter form for *οὐ δέος ἐστὶ μή τίς σε ὑβρίσῃ*. In fact, dispensing with this ellipsis removes the most fatal objection to the view of the sentence on which the old theory was based.

In whichever of the two ways above suggested the subjunctive with *οὐ μή* came to express a simple future denial, it was only natural that the Attic Greek should soon begin to use the future indicative in place of the subjunctive in the same sense. Thus we have in SOPH. *El.* 1052, *οὐ σοι μὴ μεθέψομαι ποτε*, and in ARIST. *Ran.* 508, *οὐ μὴ σ' ἐγὼ περιόψομαι*, both expressing denial. At this stage the recollection of the original clause with *μή* and the subjunctive must have been lost, as there was no corresponding clause with *μή* and the future indicative in common use, of which *οὐ μή* with the future could be the negative. A most striking proof of the entire loss of this tradition is given by examples of indirect quotation of *οὐ μή* with the future. In SOPH. *Phil.* 611 we have *τά τ' ἄλλα πάντ' ἐθέσπισεν, καὶ τὰπὶ Τροίας πέργαμ' ὥς οὐ μὴ ποτε ἐέρσοιεν εἰ μὴ τόνδε ἄγουντο*, the direct form being *οὐ μὴ ποτε ἐέρσεται ἐὰν μὴ τόνδε ἄγῃσθε*. In XEN. *Hellen.* i. 6, 32, *εἶπεν ὅτι ἡ Σπάρτη οὐδὲν μὴ κάκιον οἰκισταὶ αὐτοῦ ἀποθανόντος*, the future indicative is retained in an otherwise similar construction. In EUR. *Phoen.* 1590, we find *εἶπε Τειρεσίας οὐ μὴ ποτε, σοὺ τήνδε γῆν οἰκοῦντος, εὖ πράξειν πόλιν*, representing *οὐ μὴ ποτε εὖ πράξει*. We could not explain *οὐ μὴ πράξειν* as an independent expression on any theory, either with or without an ellipsis. Such forms show the advanced stage which the construction of *οὐ μή* had reached.

We find in the Roman comic poets a few cases of *neque* with *haud* in the same clause, forming a single negative. Such are PLAUT. *Bacch.* 1037, *Neque ego haud committam ut, si quid peccatum siet, fecisse dicas de mea sententia*; and TER. *Andr.* 205, *Neque tu haud dices tibi non praedictum*. *Neque haud* may fairly be supposed to be a translation of *οὐδὲ μή* in the Greek original. If it is, it shows that the Roman poet understood *οὐ μή* with the subjunctive or the future indicative as a simple expression of denial.

When *οὐ μή* with the future indicative had been established as a

regular form of future denial, the second person singular probably began to be used as a form of prohibition. As the future could be used in positive commands in an imperative sense, as in πάντως δὲ τοῦτο δράσεις, *but by all means do this*, ARIST. *Nub.* 1352, it could also take the simple οὐ in prohibitions, as in χειρὶ οὐ ψάσεις ποτε, *you shall not touch me with your hand, or do not touch me*, EUR. *Med.* 1320. The dramatists soon introduced the new form with οὐ μή into such prohibitions, generally with the future indicative, but occasionally with the more primitive subjunctive. Thus οὐ μή καταβήσει had the sense of *do not come down*, derived from *you shall not come down*, as οὐ ψάσεις (above) from meaning *you shall not touch* came to mean *do not touch*. One of the strongest objections to the older views of the forms with οὐ μή is that they generally require a distinct explanation of this prohibitory construction. Elmsley's theory of a question with two negatives, explaining οὐ μή καταβήσει; as *will you NOT NOT come down?* hence *do not come down*, was stated in the Quarterly Review for June, 1812, and in his note to EUR. *Med.* 1120 (1151 Dind.). Many who do not adopt Elmsley's theory in full still accept the interrogative form, and these sentences are now generally printed as questions. Long before Elmsley, the famous "Canon Davesianus" had proscribed all sigmatic aorist subjunctives with οὐ μή as well as with ὅπως μή. This edict removed nearly or quite all the troublesome subjunctives that would have opposed Elmsley's view, and left only the future indicative in his doubly-negated questions, which of course required an indicative. This again set up an artificial distinction in form between the prohibitory construction allowing only the future indicative, and the other construction allowing both subjunctive and future indicative.

But it has been more and more evident in later years that this distinction in form between the two constructions cannot be maintained. It was seen by Brunck, before Elmsley's interrogative theory appeared, that it would be absurd to distinguish sentences like ταῦτα οὐ μή ποτ' ἐς τὴν Σκύρον ἐκπλεύσης ἔχων, *you shall never sail away to Scyros with these arms*, SOPH. *Phil.* 381, from οὐ μή καταβήσει, *you shall not come down*, ARIST. *Vesp.* 397. He therefore wrote ἐκπλεύσεις in the former, with the note "soloece vulgo legitur ἐκπλεύσης." But ἐκπλεύσεις proved to be even a greater solecism than ἐκπλεύσης

was thought to be, for the only classic future of *πλέω* is the middle *πλεύσομαι* or *πλευσοῦμαι*, and *ἐκπλεύσει* will not suit the verse. So *ἐκπλεύσης* had to be restored. Again, while almost all the sentences containing a prohibition with *οὐ μὴ*, followed by a positive command with *ἀλλά* or *δέ*, could admit Elmsley's punctuation and interpretation, — as *οὐ μὴ λαλήσεις ἀλλ' ἀκολουθήσεις ἐμοί*; ARIST. *Nub.* 505, explained as *won't you not talk nonsense and follow me?* — another passage of the *Clouds* resisted both of these and also the prescribed form. In 296 the Mss. have *οὐ μὴ σκώψης μηδὲ ποιήσης ἄπερ οἱ τρυγοδαίμονες οὗτοι· ἀλλ' εὐφήμει*. Brunck emended this without hesitation to *οὐ μὴ σκώψεις μηδὲ ποιήσεις*, with the note “soloece vulgo *σκώψης . . . ποιήσης*.” But there was no place for Elmsley's interrogative mark, which could not stand after the imperative, and could not be inserted after *οὗτοι* without implying that the other sentences (like *Clouds* 505 above) were wrongly punctuated. The emendation *σκώψεις* was as unfortunate as *ἐκπλεύσεις*, as the future of *σκώπτω* is *σκώψομαι*, not *σκώψω*, so that a further emendation to *σκώψει* was needed. In this battered condition, and with no interrogative mark to help the interpretation, the passage usually appears, even in the latest editions. So long as it is proposed to explain these prohibitions and the ordinary denials with *οὐ μὴ* on entirely different theories, with nothing common to the two constructions, it may not seem unreasonable to force a few examples like *Nub.* 296 and 367 into conformity with the general usage. But on any theory which makes no distinction in construction between the prohibitions and the other negative expressions of denial or refusal (for example, between *οὐ μὴ ἐκπλεύσης*, *you shall not sail away*, and *οὐ μὴ καταβήσει*, *do not come down*, i.e. *you shall not come down*), there is no more reason for objecting to *οὐ μὴ σκώψης* than to *οὐ μὴ ἐκπλεύσης*. An occasional subjunctive, like *οὐ μὴ σκώψης* or *οὐ μὴ ληρήσης*, is indeed no more than we should naturally expect in a construction which had its origin in the subjunctive. In such expressions, further, the analogy of the equivalent *μὴ σκώψης* and *μὴ ληρήσης* would tend to make the aorist subjunctive unobjectionable and perfectly natural. A reference to the list of passages quoted on page 66 will show the inconsistencies into which every one must fall who attempts to explain the prohibitions and the clauses of denial on different theories. We cannot separate *οὐ μὴ σκώψης* from *οὐ μὴ ἐκπλεύσης* in construction, nor the latter

from οὐ μὴ πάθῃς, nor this again from οὐ μὴ τις ἑβρίσῃ, on any consistent principle of interpretation.¹

One class of sentences have been claimed as decisive witnesses in favor of the interrogative theory. They are represented by οὐ θάσσον οἶσεις, μὴδ' ἀπιστήσεις ἐμοί; *will you not more quickly extend it* (your hand), *and not distrust me?* SOPH. Tr. 1183. These are undoubted questions, but there is no construction with οὐ μὴ in them. They consist of one question with οὐ, implying an affirmative answer, *will you not extend your hand?* and another with μὴ, implying a negative answer, *and you will not distrust me, will you?* The compound of the two has the general sense expressed in the first translation above.

In conclusion, we may sum up the result of the investigation as follows. The original construction of οὐ μὴ with the subjunctive was developed as a negative form of the independent subjunctive with μὴ, which had already become an expression of apprehension with desire to avert its object, even if it had not passed into the stage of a cautious assertion; in either case the real negative force of μὴ was in abeyance. The aorist subjunctive is the most common form here, the present being less frequent. This form of future denial next admitted the future indicative in the same sense as the subjunctive. The second person singular of this future with οὐ μὴ was used by the dramatists as a prohibition, without abandoning the sense which the future can always have in both positive and negative commands. In these prohibitions the future indicative, in which they had their origin, is generally used; but the subjunctive occasionally occurs, being analogous to the ordinary aorist subjunctive with μὴ in prohibitions; e.g. μὴ σκώψῃς supporting οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς.²

¹ For a further discussion of the form of the sentences with οὐ μὴ, in connection with that of clauses with ὅπως and with the Canon Davesianus, see Transactions of the American Philological Association for 1869-70, pp. 46-55.

² Since this paper was written, I have seen that Kvičala, in two articles on οὐ μὴ in the *Zeitschrift für die oesterreichischen Gymnasien* for 1856, proposed an explanation of οὐ μὴ with the subjunctive, which at one important point came very near the view now presented. He states two (apparently theoretical) meanings which he supposes μὴ θάρσῃς to have had at some period (zwei Bedeutungsentwickelungen): one, "Du wirst doch wol am Ende, trotzdem dass ich es abzuwehren suche, sterben"; the other, "Ich fürchte, dass du doch wol (trotz meiner Abwehr) sterben werdest." By prefixing οὐ to μὴ θάρσῃς in these meanings, he

arrives at two meanings of οὐ μή with the subjunctive. The second of these comes so near the independent subjunctive with μή in Homer, that it is surprising that neither this nor the equally important μή in Plato is mentioned. But no use is made of the advantage here gained in explaining οὐ μή with the future indicative, either in prohibitions or in denials. The prohibitions are made interrogative, οὐ μή δυσμενὴς ἔσσει; being explained as "Nicht wahr? — du wirst doch nicht feindselig seyn?" The future of denial is explained simply as developed from the interrogative future, as a form of reply to this, by leaving out the interrogative element.